In recent weeks the business of the Bamboo Union triads have been apparent from cases in Taiwan, where the group is centred and most active.

The Bamboo Union triad society, or United Bamboo Gang, or ‘Chuk Luen Bong’ (竹聯幫), was established in Taiwan in 1956, largely comprised of many offspring of mainland Chinese who had fled from the communist forces in 1949. One group of Chinese exiles residing at Wing Wor Village on the outskirts of Taipei were repeatedly attacked and extorted by established local gangs, and so they grouped together to form the Chuk Luen Bong, literally translated as ‘Bamboo United Gang’ with the name derived from the bamboo groves that surrounded Wing Wor Village. The Bamboo United Gang were generally supportive of the Kuomintang and flourished. The original United Bamboo Triad society was reportedly comprised of five branches, which were lion, tiger, leopard, phoenix, and duck.

Read the full article here: https://asiacrimecentury.substack.com/p/young-and-dangerous-the-new-age-digital

The Himalayas are so huge and complex that explaining their characteristics and relevance requires a historian of substantial experience. John Keay has such experience, having written over 20 historical books covering China, India, and other parts of Asia, encyclopaedias of Scotland and London, as well as two volumes on Himalayan exploration.

Empires have collided and cultures have clashed in the Himalayas. Buddhist India claimed it from the south, Islam put down roots in its western approaches, Mongols and Manchus rode in from the north, and, from the east, China continues to absorb what it prefers not to call Tibet. Hunters have decimated its wildlife and mountaineers have bagged its peaks.

The Himalayas, Hindu Kush, and the Karakoram are part of what is known as ‘The Third Pole’, the region that encompasses these mountain ranges with the Tibetan Plateau to the north and the Indian great plains to the south. The ice fields in the region contain the largest reserve of fresh water outside the polar regions, leading to the Third Pole being described as Asia’s “water tower,” feeding major rivers such as the Ganges, Indus, and Yangtze. The region is the source of the 10 major river systems that provide irrigation, power and drinking water to over 1.9 billion people in Asia – over 24% of the world’s population.

Research indicates that the Himalayan glaciers have shrunk by 40 per cent in the past 400 years, with as much as another two thirds of glaciers predicted to vanish by the end of the century. A consequence of this will be a decline in meltwater from the Himalayas, which will result in less river water for people downstream in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, India, Cambodia, Burma, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Laos, Pakistan, and Malaysia.

The Himalayas is also one of the most complex regions on earth. The mountain range passes through India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Bhutan and Nepal, a region riven by political divisions. In September 2022, China and India disengaged military forces from the disputed Himalaya border area following talks between senior military commanders. This followed deadly fighting between soldiers of the two countries in 2020 resulting from a build-up of Chinese forces and military infrastructure along parts of the disputed Line of Control. Despite the withdrawals, there is a constant risk of conflict in the region.

On another front, tensions remain between India and Pakistan in the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, where there are intermittent military clashes between the two sides. During the China-India dispute in 2020, the Pakistan army deployed 20,000 troops on the Line of Control border with India, illustrating how easily tension could develop into war.

The national borders around the Himalayas were not drawn by nature, but largely by the British colonial authorities. The ‘Durand Line’, established in 1893, cuts through Pashtun tribal areas from the Afghan border with Iran to the western Himalayas. The ‘McMahon Line’ is the contested boundary between China and India defined in the 1914 Simla Convention. The ‘Radcliffe Line’ defined the borders between India and Pakistan, and failed to resolve the issue of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir that chose to remain independent after partition in 1947.

The Himalaya region is home to some of the most complex problems on earth. Join the Asia Scotland Institute on 15th November to understand more about this critical region.

His latest book, ‘Himalaya – Crisis on the Roof of the World?’, published in September 2022 by Bloomsbury, is a ground breaking new look at Himalaya and how climate change is re-casting one of the world’s most unique geophysical, historical, environmental, and social regions.

On 15th November, John Keay will be with the Asia Scotland Institute at the University of Edinburgh Business School to discuss the book and talk about the wider issues of the region. History has not been kind to Himalaya. Empires have collided here, cultures have clashed. Buddhist India claimed it from the south, Islam put down roots in its western approaches, Mongols and Manchus rode in from the north, and, from the east, China continues to absorb what it prefers not to call Tibet. Hunters have decimated its wildlife and mountaineers have bagged its peaks.

The Himalayas, Hindu Kush, and the Karakoram are part of what is known as ‘The Third Pole’, the region that encompasses these mountain ranges with the Tibetan Plateau to the north and the Indian great plains to the south. The ice fields in the region contain the largest reserve of fresh water outside the polar regions, leading to the Third Pole being described as Asia’s “water tower,” feeding major rivers such as the Ganges, Indus, and Yangtze. The region is the source of the 10 major river systems that provide irrigation, power and drinking water to over 1.9 billion people in Asia – over 24% of the world’s population.

Research indicates that the Himalayan glaciers have shrunk by 40 per cent in the past 400 years, with as much as another two thirds of glaciers predicted to vanish by the end of the century. A consequence of this will be a decline in meltwater from the Himalayas, which will result in less river water for people downstream in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, India, Cambodia, Burma, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Laos, Pakistan, and Malaysia.

The Himalayas is also one of the most complex regions on earth. The mountain range passes through India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Bhutan and Nepal, a region riven by political divisions. In September 2022, China and India disengaged military forces from the disputed Himalaya border area following talks between senior military commanders. This followed deadly fighting between soldiers of the two countries in 2020 resulting from a build-up of Chinese forces and military infrastructure along parts of the disputed Line of Control. Despite the withdrawals, there is a constant risk of conflict in the region.

On another front, tensions remain between India and Pakistan in the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, where there are intermittent military clashes between the two sides. During the China-India dispute in 2020, the Pakistan army deployed 20,000 troops on the Line of Control border with India, illustrating how easily tension could develop into war.

The national borders around the Himalayas were not drawn by nature, but largely by the British colonial authorities. The ‘Durand Line’, established in 1893, cuts through Pashtun tribal areas from the Afghan border with Iran to the western Himalayas. The ‘McMahon Line’ is the contested boundary between China and India defined in the 1914 Simla Convention. The ‘Radcliffe Line’ defined the borders between India and Pakistan, and failed to resolve the issue of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir that chose to remain independent after partition in 1947.

The Himalaya region is home to some of the most complex problems on earth. Join the Asia Scotland Institute on 15th November to understand more about this critical region.

This article was written by Institute Director, Martin Purbrick, and originally published on The Scotsman. The original article can be found published here: https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/ground-breaking-new-look-at-himalaya-and-the-crisis-on-the-roof-of-the-world-martin-purbrick-3917879

In October, the US Government published new export controls that include prohibiting the export of certain semiconductor chips made anywhere in the world with US tools from being exported to China. In August, the ‘Chips and Science Act’ was passed which the White House stated “will strengthen American manufacturing, supply chains, and national security, and invest in research and development, science and technology, and the workforce of the future to keep the United States the leader in the industries of tomorrow, including nanotechnology, clean energy, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence.” Clearly these measures are intended to ensure US primacy in the technology competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Foreign Policy magazine reports that The U.S. president has committed to rapid decoupling, whatever the consequences, stating that “In short, America’s restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration. More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China’s tech ties—have lost. This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (like biotech, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic. The pace and details are uncertain, but the strategic objective and political commitment are now clearer than ever. China’s technological rise will be slowed at any price.” This indicates that decoupling is real and accelerating.

There is effective Decoupling by the People’s Republic of China as the policy of “Dynamic Zero Covid” has interrupted supply chains, a massive change given that China accounted for 28 per cent of global manufacturing output in 2019. President Xi Jinping stated in his opening speech to the 20^th Party Congress last week that “We have adhered to the supremacy of the people and the supremacy of life, adhered to dynamic zero-COVID … and achieved major positive results in the overall prevention and control of the epidemic, and economic and social development.” There is no indication of any relaxation of the “Dynamic Zero Covid” policy and links with people and businesses in China are likely to remain limited due to the pandemic control restrictions.

With the “decoupling” of areas of economic activity by the USA and China, there are concerns that the world is entering a crisis of interdependence and even the end of globalisation. The term “decoupling” has been used to describe the lessening of political, investment, trade, innovation, and digital links between China and the West. The IMF has warned of the risk of “de-globalisation”, pointing out that the Zero-Covid policies in Asia are a glimpse of what de-globalisation would look like if trade between advanced economies and China drops.

Our panel members have deep knowledge of China. Jacob Gunter is a Senior Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), prior to which he served with the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Jacob has written a major part of the report “Decoupling: Severed Ties and Patchwork Globalisation”, released by the European Chamber in partnership with MERICS.

Charles Mok is a visiting scholar at the Global Digital Policy Incubator of the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford University. He served as an elected member of the Legislative Council in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, representing the Information Technology functional constituency, from 2012 to 2020, and prior to that formed one of the earliest Internet service providers in Hong Kong in the 1990s.

Dr. Lee Chun-yi is Director of the Taiwan Studies Program at the University of Nottingham, prior to which she had roles at the University of Duisburg, Germany, and Leiden University, the Netherlands.

To find out more about decoupling and the future of globalisation listen to the Asia Scotland Institute on Thursday 27^th October.

With the “decoupling” of areas of economic activity by the USA and China, there are concerns that the world is entering a crisis of interdependence and even the end of globalisation. The term “decoupling” has been used to describe the lessening of political, investment, trade, innovation, and digital links between China and the West.

In 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on some goods imported from China. Later that year China imposed duties of 178 per cent on Sorghum imports from the USA. The US-China trade war escalated, and relations between the two countries have continually worsened.

The Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the heightened tensions around Taiwan have expanded what was previously largely a China-US economic issue to become a wider risk of “de-globalisation”.

In 1995 New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman wrote that “the world is flat”. Friedman described a new phase of globalisation that involved a massive expansion of global Internet connectivity, and the growth of outsourcing across huge distances. This convergence occurred around 2000 and facilitated the ability to deliver intellectual work from almost anywhere in the world. These changes levelled the playing field for developing countries such as China and India.

Globalisation has evolved for centuries as trading links between countries have developed and logistics improved. For several decades before 2000, globalisation was more about companies seeking lower labour costs as well as new markets, especially in China and other countries in Asia. After 2000, globalisation involved individuals being empowered through the expanded global Internet connecting diverse knowledge pools.

Two decades later and the world has changed. The pandemic caused huge economic losses as production and services stopped, major reductions in retail spending as people stayed at home, and disruption to travel that has still not recovered.

The impact continues as the policy of “Dynamic Zero Covid” in China has interrupted supply chains, a massive change given that China accounted for 28 per cent of global manufacturing output in 2019.

The IMF has warned of the risk of “de-globalisation”, pointing out that the Zero-Covid policies in Asia are a glimpse of what de-globalisation would look like if trade between advanced economies and China drops.

The war in Ukraine has further restricted supply chains, especially for commodities such as wheat (29 per cent from Russia and Ukraine), corn (15 per cent), and sunflower oil(69 per cent), causing significant shortages and price increases. The result is globally high inflation, reaching over 10 per cent in the UK, 9.1 per cent in the Euro area, 8.5 per cent in the USA, and over 70 per cent in Argentina and Turkey. The outcome is that globalisation has stalled and the world is now a little less flat than Thomas Friedman described in 1995.

To hear more, join us on October 27th for the Asia Scotland Institute webinar – Decoupling: A crisis of interdependence the end of globalisation?

After the occupation of his residence, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country on a military jet to safety in the Maldives. His brother, a former finance minister, also left Sri Lanka, seemingly ending the family’s power in the country. The president and his government are blamed by the protesters for the economic crisis in Sri Lanka, which has resulted in power cuts as well as inflation and shortages of essential goods.

The economic crisis is not unique to Sri Lanka, but the effects have been felt in this country for many months already. Fuel supplies are limited as a result of the international supply situation, largely driven by the war in Ukraine. Inflation is a problem across the world with levels of around 9 per cent in the UK, USA, and major European countries. However, in Sri Lanka annualised consumer price inflation is estimated to be over 50 per cent and hence is having a harsh and immediate impact on the cost of living for ordinary people.

Not only does Sri Lanka have difficulties with inflation and the supply of essential goods, but the country has huge debts. China is a major creditor having provided loans for major infrastructure projects such as $155 million for the Puttalam/Norochcholai Coal Power Project that generates around one third of electricity in the country. The reliance on coal powered energy is worsened as a major supplier to Sri Lanka is Russia.

In addition, Sri Lanka owes China $8 billion related to construction of the Hambantota port, strategically located on the southern coast of Sri Lanka. After struggling to repay the debts, the Sri Lanka government signed a 99-year lease for Chinese state-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings company to control the port and surrounding 15,000 acres.

The mismanagement of Hambantota port has caused local anger in Sri Lanka after aides to former president Rajapaksa have been accused of receiving cash from the project during the 2015 presidential election. Use of Hambantota by China has caused international anxiety due to concerns that as part of the debt repayments China could use the port as a military base. Illustrating this risk, Chinese scientific research vessel ‘Yuan Wang 5’ will visit Hambantota port in August for a week reportedly to conduct satellite control and research in the Indian Ocean Region.

China has responded to suggestions that it has caused a “debt trap” in Sri Lanka, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian saying recently that, “The China-Sri Lanka practical cooperation has always been led by Sri Lanka with scientific planning and thorough verification with no strings attached”.

The elephant in the room is not China, but India which has historically close ties with Sri Lanka but a strained relationship due to Sinhalese nationalist concerns regarding excessive Indian influence. The current crisis in Sri Lanka may cause better relations between the two countries, helped by recent assistance from India that includes provision of a major credit line as well as shipments of food, fuel and fertiliser. This help from India will likely influence Sri Lankans to have a more favourable perception of their close neighbours in India, to the detriment of China.

The Asia Scotland Institute will hold a meeting to discuss the situation in Sri Lanka with experts who can project what the future is likely to hold. Stay tuned to our events schedule to hear more about Sri Lanka.

There are other pressures on economic growth that are hindering a post-Covid recovery. The OECD reported in June that Russia’s war in Ukraine is slowing economic recovery, is causing rising inflation, and has triggered a cost-of-living crisis that is affecting millions of people globally (not only in the UK).

In addition, although the world economy was on track for a strong recovery from Covid-19, the war in Ukraine as well as supply chain disruptions in China caused by the “Dynamic Zero Covid” approach are hindering recovery. Global shipping and logistics giant Maersk reported in May that despite the lockdown in Shanghai for over seven weeks the city ports continued to operate, but that truck drivers (who transport three quarters of freight in China) spent 70 per cent less time on the roads in March 2022 compared to April 2021. Ships may be able to get to China’s ports, but manufactured goods have not been able to get to the ships.

The official story from inside China is very different. The Ministry of Commerce reported in June that there should be stable growth in foreign trade this year and that “there are multiple enabling factors to stabilize foreign trade and improve trade quality”. The good economic news story, repeated across state-controlled media in China, is that exports have increased by over 15 per cent year-on-year in May, which is attributed to the control of Covid-19 cases. Zhao Ping, vice-president of the Academy of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, said: Thanks to the huge size, firm footing and strong resilience, China’s foreign trade will keep healthy growth momentum despite challenges from the slowdown in world economic recovery and rising commodity prices.”

Variable economic growth in different countries after recovery from Covid has shown that some countries have come out of the pandemic more quickly than others. The IMF projected economic growth for the UK of 7.4 per cent in 2021, 3.7 per cent in 2022, but only 1.2 per cent for 2023. The corresponding projections for the Euro area are 5.3 per cent, 2.8 per cent, and 2.3 per cent, indicating an initially faster recovery by the UK. But economic growth projections for China are 8.1 per cent in 2021, 4.4 per cent in 2022, and 5.1 per cent in 2023. Despite “Dynamic Zero Covid”, China seems to have such a huge scale of production and range of industries that its economy is more resilient and can recover from the prolonged lockdowns.

As Jörg Wuttke pointed out recently, China depends on the European market more than Europe does on China. Europe exports goods to China valued at 600 million euros every day, but China exports 1.3 billion euros worth of goods daily to Europe.

The webinar has several highly experienced executives who have spent decades working on China business. With us will be Jörg Wuttke, President of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, and Yang Du an Associate at Moller Institute, Churchill College, University of Cambridge.

The discussion will drill down into China’s current direction in terms of ease of doing business both domestically and internationally, the “Dynamic Zero-Covid” policy, and the outlook for the energy transition to carbon neutrality.

The “Dynamic Zero-Covid” policy in China is the issue creating most uncertainty across the world because of the impact on other economies. Most of the world has moved on from the huge loss of life and economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but the relentless fixation on a policy of “Dynamic Zero Covid” is impacting supply chains that are reliant upon China.

There are other pressures on economic growth that are hindering a post-Covid recovery. The OECD reported in June in The Price of War that Russia’s war in Ukraine is slowing economic recovery, is causing rising inflation, and has triggered a cost of living crisis that is affecting millions of people globally (not only in the UK). The OECD also notes that indicators of business confidence and output have fallen sharply in China, reflecting the lockdowns in many cities and ports, as well as continuing vulnerabilities of highly leveraged real estate companies that have hit equity markets.

In addition, although the world economy was on track for a strong recovery from Covid-19, the war in Ukraine as well as supply chain disruptions in China caused by the “Dynamic Zero Covid” approach are hindering recovery. In May, global shipping and logistics giant Maersk reported in China landside challenges affecting supply chains that despite the lockdown in Shanghai for over 7 weeks the city ports continued to operate, but that truck drivers (who transport three-quarters of freight in China) spent 70% less time on the roads in March 2022 compared to April 2021. Ships may be able to get to China’s ports, but manufactured goods have not been able to get to the ships.

Another economic indicator to keep an eye on are cost increases in China. The Jamestown Foundation reports that from April 2021 to April 2022, fresh vegetable prices rose by 24%, fresh fruit by 14.1%, eggs by 13.3%, and potatoes by 11.8%. In addition, the prices of petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum increased by 29.0%, 31.7% and 26.9% respectively. This is a clear illustration that rampant inflation is not confined to the UK and is a global issue caused by a the pandemic, war, and constrained supply chains.

The official story from inside China is more positive. The Ministry of Commerce was reported by the China Daily in June as stating that there should be stable growth in foreign trade this year and that “there are multiple enabling factors to stabilize foreign trade and improve trade quality”. The good economic news story, repeated across state controlled media in China, is that exports have increased by over 15% year on year in May, which is attributed to the control of Covid-19 cases. Zhao Ping, vice-president of the Academy of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, said that “Thanks to the huge size, firm footing and strong resilience, China’s foreign trade will keep healthy growth momentum despite challenges from the slowdown in world economic recovery and rising commodity prices.”

Variable economic growth in different countries after recovery from Covid-19 has shown that some countries have come out of the pandemic more quickly than others. The IMF reported in April in War Sets Back the Global Recovery projected economic growth for the UK of 7.4% in 2021, 3.7% in 2022, but only 1.2% for 2023. The corresponding projections for the Euro area are 5.3%, 2.8%, and 2.3%, indicating an initially faster recovery by the UK. But economic growth projections for China are 8.1% in 2021, 4.4% in 2022, and 5.1% in 2023. Despite “Dynamic Zero Covid”, China seems to have such a huge scale of production and range of industries that its economy is more resilient and can recover from the prolonged lockdowns.

As Jörg Wuttke pointed our recently in an interview with Deutsche Welle, The China shock: Germany turns away from its biggest trading partner, China depends on the European market more than Europe does on China. Europe exports goods to China valued at 600 million Euros every day, but China exports 1.3 billion Euros worth of goods daily to Europe.

Once again the sheer scale of manufacturing, of exports, and of its total economy indicate that despite China having as many if not more indicators of economic slowdown it is capable of pulling through and avoiding recession. Join us for the discussion on 23 June to hear more views on the outlook for trade with China in the post-Covid world.

Some analysts have suggested that the Cold War never ended and the Ukraine war is part of this ongoing confrontation. Great power competition has continued as the Korean peninsula remains divided, China is communist and insists on reclaiming Taiwan, there is continued resistance to American power as well as the west’s professed ideals, and the potential for nuclear war remains. Hence the Ukraine war is simply a continuation of the Cold War, which increasingly has Asia at its centre.

The most obvious impact of the Ukraine war in Asia is on how threats from China are now perceived, and also how the Chinese government perceives its ability to exercise power and influence in Asia. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clearly stated that “Taiwan for sure is not Ukraine.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying has said that “Taiwan has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory. This is an indisputable historical and legal fact. The one-China principle is a universally recognized norm governing international relations. The Taiwan region’s peace hinges on the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, rather than fawning on foreign forces for arms sales and military support. “Taiwan independence” only leads to a dead end. No one shall have any illusion or make any miscalculation on this issue.” As Vladimir Putin conflates Ukraine with greater Russia, so too does the CCP believe that Taiwan is part of greater China, based on the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty.

The Chinese government is resolute in making statements about ‘One China’, but the Ukraine war has cast further doubt on the ability of the Chinese military to stage a successful invasion of Taiwan. The government of the Republic of China Taiwan may see their chances differently after the Ukraine war. Taiwan analysts are considering how the island could best prepare for invasion by deploying defensive systems that are short-range, able to survive an initial bombardment from a larger adversary, and suitable for deployment close to home in defence of the island should it come under blockade or attack. Taiwan is likely to focus more on sea mines and anti-ship cruise missiles to counter amphibious forces, improved air defences, and stockpile large amounts of small and cheap asymmetric weapons such as coastal defence missiles, and drones. An invasion of Taiwan would still be devastating, as is the war in Ukraine.

The Chinese government may be learning military lessons from the Ukraine war but it is more likely that their strategy has not changed. Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, recently commented that if Taiwan was to declare independence this would cross a red line for China and they would not hesitate to launch an attack even if they felt that they could not achieve success. China has a sophisticated toolbox of grey zone tactics that are below the threshold of an invasion which are intended to instil a psychological sense of despair in Taiwan that the USA cannot defend them and they should surrender. Glaser suggested there is a clear lesson from Ukraine for the Chinese military that if they invade Taiwan they should use overwhelming force, decapitate the leadership, and control the air.

The world is a changed place after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the cold war may never have ended and Asia is just as affected as is Europe by the geopolitical and economic impact.