China is aggressively pursuing its maritime claims in the South China Sea (SCS) using grey zone activities through deeper coordination between the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). With these ‘grey zone’ tactics, China aims to avoid escalation and war by keeping tensions below the threshold of conflict, as evident in the case of the Philippines. A ‘grey zone’ is defined as “an ambiguous grey area that is neither fully war nor fully peace” – where actors seek to achieve their political objectives through meticulously planned and coordinated campaigns incrementally over time rather than through decisive actions within a specific timeframe. As a result, China’s tactics involve increased patrols, harassment of Philippine vessels, and resource exploitation within the contested areas, such as on April 30, 2024, the CCG fired high-pressure water cannons at two Philippine vessels near the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, causing damage to both- as Manila accused China’s actions as “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous”.
The maritime territorial dispute between China and the Philippines revolves around the northeastern section of the Spratly Islands (China: Xisha Islands, Philippines: Kalayaan Island Group) and the Scarborough Shoal (China: Huangyan Dao, Philippines: Bajo de Masinloc). China claims all islands, territories and waters within the ten-dash line (issued in 2023) which also overlaps with the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. Aside from China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims in the SCS. The Chinese and Philippines vessels are engaged in confrontation in two major areas: the Scarborough Shoal, occupied by China after the 2012 standoff, and the Second Thomas Shoal, controlled by the Philippines, where Manila intentionally grounded World War II era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre to assert its claim. The recent tensions are caused by Chinese vessels using military-grade lasers and water cannons against supply ships heading to assist the warship in the Second Thomas Shoal. As found, the number of Chinese vessels at Second Thomas Shoal during Philippine resupply missions has significantly increased, from an average of one ship in 2021 to approximately 14 ships in 2023, with the most recent resupply mission on 10 December 2023 involving 46 Chinese ships compared to just 4 for the Philippines. In this regard, the maritime militia comprised of civilian fishing vessels and fishermen operating under the government’s direction collaborates with the CCG to harass, intimidate, and obstruct other countries’ activities within the SCS.
Given the rise in tensions, a recent survey report in the South China Sea Morning Post showed that 73 per cent of the 1,200 respondents nationwide favoured “further asserting the Philippines’ territorial rights through military action, such as expanded naval patrols and troop presence in the West Philippine Sea”. Besides, Filipino President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr, at the 2024 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, categorically stated:
“[I]f, by a wilful act, not only a Filipino serviceman but even a Filipino citizen, is killed by a wilful act, that is, I think, very, very close to what we define as an act of war, and therefore we will respond accordingly. […] Is that a red line? Almost certainly it is going to be a red line”.
China so far has not crossed the threshold of war against the Philippines, as noted, the CCG applies coercion using ‘non-lethal’ force (water cannons)—a slow-intensity conflict approach or low-intensity coercion by which China uses incremental steps to expand its de facto control over disputed territories. The use of ‘water cannons’ by the CCG is a new addition to China’s use of ‘grey zone’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ techniques in the SCS, after establishing domestic laws, building artificial islands, and releasing the ten-dash line map- coinciding with Sun Tzu’s dictum of subduing the enemy without fighting.
A 2022 RAND report argues that while China employs grey zone tactics in every domain, but it is more predominant in employing maritime military grey zone tactics against its adversaries. Especially in the case of the SCS, China has adopted multifaceted grey zone tactics, which include: establishing a series of domestic laws to bolster its claims in the SCS, such as the 1992 Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Baseline Declaration, and the establishment of an EEZ and continental shelf- which have unilaterally incorporated disputed features within China’s maritime territory. These laws often utilize ambiguous terminology, such as the infamous “nine-dash line” and references to “adjacent waters”– a way to create a sense of expansive maritime claims that exceed internationally recognised baselines as defined by the UNCLOS.
In the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China has transformed the submerged features into artificial islands and has further fortified these outposts by constructing runways, military facilities, and other infrastructure. The other tactic, as prevalent in the case of the Philippines is the deployment of the CCG and maritime militia to assert its claims in the SCS. This has become rampant with the creation of the CCG in 2013 and with the 2021 Coast Guard Law which authorized China’s maritime law-enforcement fleets to use lethal force on foreign ships operating in China’s waters, including the disputed waters claimed by China. Furthermore, in May 2024, China issued a new regulation which authorized the CCG commanders to detain foreign vessels and persons in “waters under China’s jurisdiction” for up to 60 days. In June 2024, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that it would allow the Philippines to deliver living necessities to the grounded warship or evacuate the personnel concerned- “if the Philippines notifies the Chinese side in advance”. Hence, the query remains: Will the dangerous manoeuvres of the CCG and maritime militia push the escalation beyond the threshold? Thus, raising the possibility of a potential conflict between the two parties. If this happens, it will disrupt the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region- thus, getting Manila’s allies and partners, such as the US involved in the crisis.
Dr. Amrita Jash is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations (DGIR), Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal, India. She holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She was a Pavate Fellow at the University of Cambridge. Dr. Jash has authored China’s Japan Policy: Learning from the Past (Palgrave/Springer, 2023) and The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy (Pentagon Press 2021). Her research interests are: China’s foreign policy, Chinese military, security and strategic issues in China-India and China-Japan relations as well as the Indo-Pacific.
Ms. Varshini S holds a master’s in Geopolitics and International Relations from the Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal, India Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal, India.
